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Remedies
By JUDITH K. JONES*
INTRODUCTION
During this survey period' Kentucky courts faced a number
of challenges to punitive damage awards. This Survey addresses
the propriety of punitive damages in both gross negligence and
intentional tort cases; the assessment criteria used to fix the
award; an employer's vicarious liability for punitive damages;
and the propriety of punitive damages in first party bad faith
actions. The author hopes that the variety of decisions discussed
below will provide the reader with an instructive overview of
punitive damage law in Kentucky.
I. PROPRIETY OF A PUNITIVE DAMAGE AwARD
A. The Threshold Issue: Are Punitive Damages Warranted?
Kentucky, in accordance with most jurisdictions, 2 character-
izes the function of punitive damages as a punishment of the
defendant for some "outrageous" 3 conduct and as a deterrent
to defendant and others from engaging in similar future miscon-
duct. 4 Conduct considered "outrageous" involves more than the
* J.D. Candidate, University of Kentucky, 1986. The author expresses her appre-
ciation to Kenneth B. Germain, Professor of Law, for his assistance in the preparation
of this Survey.
The survey period comprises July 1, 1983 through July 31, 1985.
See I J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, PUNITIvE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRACTICE § 4.14
(1984).
See Ashland Dry Goods Co. v. Wages, 195 S.W.2d 312, 315 (Ky. 1946).
See id., cited in, Hensley v. Paul Miller Ford, 508 S.W.2d 759, 762 (Ky. 1974).
Earlier Kentucky cases contemplated a compensatory function for punitive damages. See
generally, Comment, Zen and the Art of Exemplary Damages Assessment, 72 Ky. L.J.
897, 903-07 (1983-84), for a discussion of the purposes advanced by Kentucky courts
for assessing punitive damages.
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commission of a wrongful act.' Such an act must be committed
willfully, maliciously, or in such a manner as to indicate a
wanton or reckless disregard for the injured plaintiff's rights.
6
Thus, the threshold issue in determining the propriety of granting
a punitive damage award is ascertaining whether the aggravated
circumstances exist that merit this remedy. 7 Elucidating specific
standards on this issue has proved troublesome for Kentucky
courts "because the misconduct involved cuts across the spec-
trum of tort litigation, rather than being restricted to one type
of tort or .. .injury." 8
1. Punitive Damages for Gross Negligence
Mere negligence does not provide a sufficient basis for im-
posing punitive damages. 9 Even gross negligence, absent a cul-
pable mental state, has been held insufficient to justify a punitive
award.' 0 A negligent act that warrants the sting of punitive
See 508 S.W.2d at 762 ("[T]here must be more than a wrong resulting in
damages.").
6 See Holloway Constr. Co. v. Smith, 683 S.W.2d 248, 250 (Ky. 1984); Bisset v.
Goss, 481 S.W.2d 71, 73 (Ky. 1972); 195 S.W.2d at 315; Island Creek Coal Co. v.
Rodgers, 644 S.W.2d 339, 347 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
7 See Horton v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 690 S.W.2d 382, 389 (Ky.
1985); Fowler v. Mantooth, 683 S.W.2d 250, 252 (Ky. 1984).
683 S.W.2d at 252. See also 690 S.W.2d at 388; 508 S.W.2d at 762.
See Keller v. Morehead, 247 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Ky. 1952) (refusal to give jury
instruction authorizing punitive damages was proper where evidence only established
issue of ordinary negligence).
10 See Cadle v. McHargue, 60 S.W.2d 973, 974-75 (Ky. 1933) (Punitive damages
cannot be assessed for gross negligence defined as failure to exercise slight care.); W.T.
Sistrunk & Co. v. Meisenheimer, 265 S.W. 467, 468 (Ky. 1924) (Punitive damages cannot
be assessed for gross negligence defined as failure to exercise slight care.). Thus, at one
time, the Kentucky Court differentiated two types of gross negligence.
One may fail to exercise slight, or any care, resulting in an accident, which
will not make him liable for punitive damages; but in order to justify the
assessment of such damages there must be the element . .. of malice or
willfulness, of such an utter and wanton disregard of the rights of others
as from which it may be assumed he was acting either maliciously or
willfully.
60 S.W.2d at 974. See also Marye v. Commonwealth, 240 S.W.2d 852, 855 (Ky. 1951)
(Willful or wanton conduct "is clearly distinguishable from negligence or from gross
negligence, the difference being one of kind and not merely of degree.") (citing 65
C.J.S., Negligence, § 9 (1966)). The standard of gross negligence defined as failure to
use slight care has fallen into disuse by the Kentucky courts. See note 11 infra and
accompanying text.
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damages is usually expressed as negligence so gross as to indicate
a wanton or reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights or safety."
"Wanton" and "reckless disregard" are amorphous terms, how-
ever, which are not susceptible of precise definition. 2 In some cases,
the degree of negligence to which the terms "wanton" or "reck-
less" are applied involves evidence of a defendant's conscious
indifference to some known or probable harm.'3 Thus, punitive
damages are warranted because the defendant's act is accom-
panied by the bad mental state that justifies the award. In
contrast, when there is no direct evidence of a bad mental state
and it must be inferred from evidence of substandard conduct
alone, the issue of whether punitives are warranted is inherently
problematic for the courts. A recent Kentucky case illustrates
this difficulty.
In Horton v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 4 the plain-
tiffs' home was destroyed by an explosion resulting from natural
gas leaking into the home from a break in the line at the street.
A gas company customer representative, who responded to the
plaintiffs' complaint of an odor of gas in the house, discovered
the line break, checked the plaintiffs' home, and smelled the gas
on the main floor. He did not, however, use an available explo-
sive meter device that is specifically designed to detect gas and
its point of entry in an enclosure.' The gas company's policy
did not mandate use of the device in an emergency leak situation,
" This definition of gross negligence is used exclusively in modern Kentucky cases.
See, e.g., Horton v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 690 S.W.2d at 389-90; Holloway
Constr. Co. v. Smith, 683 S.W.2d at 250; Hensley v. Paul Miller Ford, 508 S.W.2d at
762; Bisset v. Goss, 481 S.W.2d at 73; Island Creek Coal Co. v. Rodgers, 644 S.W.2d
at 347.
11 See, e.g., 481 S.W.2d at 73 (citing Louisville & N.R.R. v. Jones' Adm'r, 180
S.W.2d 555, 558 (Ky. 1944)). The terms "wanton," and "reckless" are used synony-
mously with "oppressively, or with malice as implies a spirit of mischief or criminal
indifference to civil obligations." Id. See also Louisville & N.R.R. v. George, 129
S.W.2d 986, 989 (Ky. 1939) (citing Higbee Co. v. Jackson, 128 N.E. 61, 65 (Ohio 1920))
("A complete indifference to consequences distinguishes wrongs caused by wantoness
and recklessness from torts arising from negligence.").
11 See 683 S.W.2d at 250 (construction contractor continued blasting on highway
project after receiving notice of ensuing damage to plaintiff's property); 644 S.W.2d at
347 (strip mining operator continued underground blasting after receiving complaints of
damage).
690 S.W.2d 382 (Ky. 1985).
Id. at 386.
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leaving this decision to the employee's own judgment.' 6 The
customer representative erroneously concluded that the gas em-
anating from the break outside was entering the house through
the chimney and instructed the plaintiffs to close the damper. 7
At trial, the employee testified that, subsequently, the gas odor
dissipated.'" He also suggested that the kitchen exhaust fan be
kept running under his mistaken assumption that the fan vented
to the outside. The fan actually vented into the attic. After
telephoning a repair crew, the customer representative departed,
telling the plaintiffs their home was safe. He did not reenter the
home. The field crew supervisor who arrived to repair the break
never checked the house, nor did he cut off the gas or evacuate
the plaintiffs, which he had authority to do. 19 There was con-
flicting testimony at trial on whether the supervisor was told gas
had been detected in the house. 20 Twenty minutes after the field
crew arrived, the house exploded, apparently due to continued
accumulation of gas inside the house.
2'
The plaintiffs sued the gas company alleging negligence and
gross negligence by the company and its employees. 22 After a
three week jury trial,23 the plaintiffs recovered $109,254 in com-
pensatory damages and $520,000 in punitive damages. 24 The gas
company, although conceding its employees' negligence, 2 ap-
pealed the punitive damage award arguing that the evidence was
insufficient to submit the issue of gross negligence to the jury.
26
The court of appeals, in a unanimous panel decision, agreed
See id. at 387.
" Id. at 386.
' See Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Horton, No. 82-CA-1280-MR, slip op.
at 3 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 1984).
19 690 S.W.2d at 386.
20 See id. The field supervisor testified that he would have checked every room in
the house with the explosive meter and would have continually monitored the house had
he known there was gas in the house. The gas company records introduced at trial
indicated that the first gas company employee had informed the field supervisor of the
presence of gas. See id.
2, Id.
22 See id. at 384.
2- See No. 82-CA-1280-MR, slip op. at 4.
11 See 690 S.W.2d at 384.
21 See id. at 387.
'6 See No. 82-CA-1280-MR, slip op. at 1.
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with the gas company and reversed the award, ruling that the
gas company's employees' conduct did not amount to "wanton
and reckless indifference for [the plaintiffs'] lives and prop-
erty." ' 21 Although the court conceded that "very poor judgment' '28
was exercised and that "serious errors in judgment ' 29 were
made, it distinguished the "failure to use slight care" standard
of gross negligence, which does not warrant punitive damages,
from conduct that does warrant punitive damages.3" That court
attributed the employees' cumulative negligent acts to the
"single" 1 ' erroneous assumption that the gas entered the home
through the chimney and that closing the damper averted any
danger.3 2
In response to the plaintiffs' assertion that the gas company
itself was negligent by failing to require the explosive meter's
use, the court stated that no law or regulation mandated such a
procedure at the time of the explosion.3
On further appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court upheld the
trial verdict and judgment and accused the intermediate court
of usurping the jury's role in this case.3 4 The Court criticized
the appellate court's conclusion that the evidence was insufficient
:" Id. slip op. at 6.
Id. slip op. at 5.
-' Id. slip op. at 6.
See id. slip op. at 5. "[I1f an injury results from a tortfeasor's negligence,
punitive damages are recoverable only if the negligent act is so outrageous as to indicate
a wanton and reckless disregard for the interests, safety, and life of the plaintiff.
[Citations omitted]. Further, even a failure to exercise slight care is insufficient."
1I ld. Specifically, the court attributed the employees' failure to use the explosive
meter, the failure to ascertain the accumulation of gas in the attic, the failure to dissipate
the gas in the house, and the failure to warn the plaintiffs to take precautionary measures
against an explosion, to the employee's belief that the open damper was the source of
the problem.
'" See id.
See id. slip op. at 6.
See 690 S.W.2d at 385.
The more judges take cases away from juries, the more the concepts of
reasonable conduct, negligence and gross negligence become synonymous
with the view of the judge or judges on that court ....
The role of the appellate court when deciding negligence issues of this sort
is limited to viewing the evidence from a standpoint most favorable to the
prevailing party.
1985-86]
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to support a finding of wanton and reckless disregard for the
plaintiffs' safety and further chastised the court for engaging in
its own fact finding to reach such a conclusion .
3
The Supreme Court found, from the facts of the case, that
"the jury could conclude ... that the employees were aware
that gas had escaped into the Horton house, was probably still
there and still leaking into the house.' '36 This conclusion, if
supported by the evidence, would indicate a conscious wrong-
doing-a conscious disregard of probable harm, which would
justify liability for punitive damages. How the Court drew this
conclusion is unclear. It cited no evidence that would indicate
that the employees acted in conscious disregard of some known
danger, but permitted the jury to make this inference on the
basis of conduct alone. Indeed, according to the Horton dissent-
ers, facts that would reasonably support this conclusion were
not discernible from the record.
37
Nevertheless, the gross negligence vel non of the employees
was not dispositive in this case. A substantial portion of the
opinion dealt with the Court's criticism of the gas company's
training policies and procedures38 (which, however, apparently
complied with all safety regulations of the Public Service Com-
mission).39 In particular, the Court relied on the testimony of
one Mr. Murphy, then the Chief Utility Inspector for the Ken-
tucky Public Service Commission, as "the most damaging
evidence'' 4° on the issue of the propriety of the punitive award.
During the four months prior to the explosion, Murphy had
urged the gas company to adopt a model emergency plan he had
personally developed. 4' The plan specifically required that the
explosive meter be used in emergency gas leak situations.4 2 More-
' See id.
16 Id. at 387.
7 See id. at 391 (Stephenson, J., dissenting); id. at 392 (Vance, J., dissenting)
("[T]here is nothing to suggest . . . that the circumstances were such that he must have
known, but just didn't care, about the danger to others.").
1 See id. at 387-88.
19 See id. at 391 (Stephenson, J., dissenting) ("According to the record the com-
pany was in compliance with all pertinent safety rules and regulations of the Public
Service Commission.").
Id. at 387.
' See id.
.2 See id.
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over, the Court referred to evidence offered at trial that the gas
company resented Murphy's "nit-picking" 43 attempts to improve
safety procedures and misrepresented to the Public Service Com-
mission the training its employees received. 44 On the basis of his
testimony, the Court drew the startling conclusion that imple-
mentation of the model plan "would have prevented the explo-
sion." '45 The Court took the view that under a "totality of
circumstances,' '46 the evidence "viewed cumulatively ' 47 sup-
ported the jury's finding of "wanton or reckless disregard for
the lives, safety or property of other persons.' 4
In reaching its decision, the Court emphatically stressed that
the employees' actions and the company's actions must be viewed
together.49 In support of its position, the Court adopted a state-
ment (from the plaintiffs' brief)5° by the Wyoming Supreme
Court:5' "Even where a single act of negligence might not constitute
gross negligence, gross negligence may result from the several
acts." 52
As Justice Stephenson pointed out in his dissent, Brown v.
Riner, quoted above, is totally inapposite to the facts in Horton.
In Brown, the Wyoming Court was referring to several simul-
taneous factors that together supported a finding of gross neg-
ligence, determined for purposes other than a decision on punitive
damages.53 Justice Stephenson condemned the majority view as
" See id.
- See id.
' Id. The Horton majority engaged in its own fact-finding by drawing this con-
clusion. In their brief to the Supreme Court, plaintiffs went only so far as to assert a
probability that the explosion would not have occurred. Brief for Movants, at 7, Horton
v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 690 S.W.2d 382 (Ky. 1985).
See 690 S.W.2d at 387.
I d.
Id. at 387-88.
See id. at 387, 388, 390. The Court stated that although it was "reasonably
arguable" that the employees' acts were grossly negligent, the "evidence regarding
policies and procedures of the company must also be considered." Id. at 388.
Brief for Movants, at 25, 690 S.W.2d 382.
Brown v. Riner, 500 P.2d 524 (Wyo. 1972).
'2 Id. at 528.
The case involved an automobile accident in which the driver crashed into a
traffic light pole located in the center of an intersection. The injured plaintiff brought
suit against the deceased driver's estate. The Wyoming Supreme Court found that the
issue of gross negligence should have been submitted to the jury where there was evidence
1985-86]
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inventing a new standard for gross negligence-" adding together
several ordinary negligent factors to make out a case of gross
negligence." '5 4 He further cautioned that "a multitude of cases
not ordinarily thought of as gross negligence cases will qual-
ify." 5
5
Justice Vance dissented separately, arguing that the employ-
ees' conduct did not justify punitive damages.56 According to
Justice Vance, punitive damages are appropriate only when there
is evidence of conscious wrongdoing-" (1) intentional wrong-
doing, or (2) conduct which is so inherently dangerous to the
lives and safety of others that the actor is bound to have known
... the likelihood of such harm but nevertheless engaged in the
conduct without regard for its consequences. ' 5 7 In Justice Vance's
view, there was no conscious wrongdoing by the employees.
Rather, they "proceed[ed] ahead entirely oblivious of any dan-
ger. "'
58
Both Justice Vance and Justice Stephenson concluded that
Murphy's testimony was irrelevant since the gas company had
not violated any pertinent rule or regulation. 9
The Horton majority also addressed the defendant's argu-
ment that punitive damages should be abolished in gross negli-
gence cases. Noting that the propriety of punitive damages does
that the driver had been drinking, was exceeding the speed limit and had struck a plainly
visible pole. The issue of punitive damages was not before the Brown court. Whether
the damages requested included punitives is not stated. The issue of gross negligence
was crucial in Brown because under a pertinent guest statute, plaintiff could not recover
any damages unless gross negligence was proved. See id. at 525, 527 n.2. The majority's
reliance on the Brown rationale is not persuasive in this case, nor was the Brown
proposition necessary to grasp the majority's meaning, i.e., the employees' acts had to
be evaluated with reference to the company's procedures. The issues of the employees'
negligence and alleged lack of training were inextricably linked.
690 S.W.2d at 391.
Id. at 392.
, See id.
" Id.
" Id.
' See id. at 391 (Stephenson, J., dissenting); id. at 392 (Vance, J., dissenting).
The court of appeals never reached the issue of whether Murphy's evidence was com-
petent. It did, however, conclude that "while the evidence as to the commission's plan
may have been relevant to the issue of whether [the gas company] negligently evaluated
the danger in regard to the gas leak at [plaintiff's] home .... it was not evidence which
justified the giving of an instruction on punitive damages." No. 82-CA-1280-MR, slip
op. at 6-7.
[V/ol. 74
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not turn on whether an act is intentional or negligent, 6° the
Court reiterated that the threshold for the award is "whether
the misconduct 'has the character of outrage.' ",61
[N]egligence when gross has the same character of outrage
justifying punitive damages as does willful and malicious mis-
conduct in torts where the injury is intentionally inflicted....
[W]anton or reckless disregard for the lives and safety of others
[may] be implied from the nature of the misconduct. 62
How one interprets the gross negligence standard of "wanton
or reckless disregard," which was submitted to the jury in this
case, 63 may explain the differences of opinion exemplified in
Horton. The court of appeals and the Horton dissenters, who
felt that the employees' actions alone were determinative, were
not satisfied from the evidence that the employees exhibited a
conscious indifference to potential harm." The majority's view
does not expressly require a finding of conscious wrongdoing
(although the majority stretched the evidence to conclude that a
jury could have found that the employees were aware that gas
was still leaking into the house). Yet, permitting a jury to infer
a culpable mental state, absent such a finding, suggests an ex-
treme result alone always will provide the basis for a punitive
award. This, however, negates the idea that punitive damages
focus on the actor's mental state. Admittedly, not every case in
which punitive damages are warranted will manifest direct evi-
dence of conscious wrongdoing. However, a jury should not
be permitted to imply a culpable mental state unless it may be
reasonably inferred from the evidence that a defendant acted
with conscious indifference to the plaintiff's rights.
65
Nevertheless, the gas company's complicity amply justifies
the result in Horton. Some of the employees' errors can be
- See 690 S.W.2d at 389. Thus, even an intentional act, such as assault or false
arrest, will not justify punitive damages absent aggravating circumstances such as "evil
motive" or "reckless indifference." The court construed these terms as "synonymous"
on the issue of the propriety of punitive damages. See id.
Id. (citing 508 S.W.2d at 762).
690 S.W.2d at 389.
See id. at 387-88.
See id. at 391 (Stephenson, J., dissenting); id. at 392 (Vance, J., dissenting);
No. 82-CA-1280-MR, slip op. at 5.
61 See text accompanying notes 74-83 infra.
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attributed to the company's alleged failures to provide adequate
training. In view of the hazardous nature of gas, and the dire
consequences of an explosion (referred to by the Horton major-
ity),6 6 the public utility's apparent refusal to adopt feasible safety
procedures does indicate a conscious indifference to the safety
of its customers. Punishing the company by a substantial puni-
tive award will likely influence its future conduct (and that of
its employees) as well as the conduct of other companies. Thus
the function of punitive damages arguably is well-served in this
case.
2. Punitive Damages for Intentional Torts
The Kentucky Supreme Court also considered the propriety
of awarding punitive damages in an intentional tort case in
Fowler v. Mantooth,67 decided prior to Horton. Fowler, which
is treated more thoroughly in the next section of this Survey, 63
involved a civil suit for assault and battery. 69 The Fowler Court
reasoned that while an intentional tort may not in and of itself
justify punitive damages, such an allowance is appropriate when
the tortious act is committed willfully or maliciously. 70 A jury is
permitted to imply malice from the nature of the conduct-"so
long as the conduct is sufficient to evidence conscious wrong-
doing." '7' Thus, even an assault will not justify imposition of
punitive damages absent a bad mental state, as when provocation
existed for the assault.7 2 This view is entirely consistent with
prior cases that established that the existence of a bad mental state,
and not the wrongful act itself, controls the issue of whether
punitive damages are authorized."
Fowler is inconsistent, however, with the Court's later deci-
sion in Horton74 where the Court did not apply the threshold
1 690 S.W.2d at 387.
683 S.W.2d 250 (Ky. 1984).
See text accompanying notes 84-109 infra.
9 See 683 S.W. 2d at 251.
See id.
71 Id.
,2 See note 60 supra. See also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.010 (Bobbs-Merrill
1970) (Provocation may be pled as a defense to, or to mitigate, a claim for punitive
damages in a civil assault or assault and battery action.)
" See notes 5-7 supra and accompanying text.
' 690 S.W.2d 382 (Ky. 1985), discussed fully at text accompanying notes 14-66,
supra.
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requirement of conduct evincing a conscious wrongdoing. 75 Fow-
ler cited Hensley v. Paul Miller Ford6 to support its position
that only conscious wrongdoing justifies punitive damages.
77
Hensley involved negligent conduct, 78 as did Horton.79 Conse-
quently, the type of tort at issue presumably does not alter the
threshold requirement for imposing punitive damages. The Hor-
ton Court, however, approved a jury instruction in a gross
negligence case which permits the jury to infer a culpable mental
state without regard to whether the evidence supported a finding
of conscious wrongdoing. 80 As noted previously, the Horton
decision may well turn on the evidence of the gas company's
alleged abuses. 81 Keeping in mind the function of punitive dam-
ages,8 2 there is no logical reason to require an element of con-
scious wrongdoing in an intentional tort case and to ignore such
a requirement in a case that involves negligent conduct. 83
B. Assessment Factors
1. Seriousness of Injury
After punitive damages are determined to be appropriate, a
second but related inquiry concerns the factors used to fix the
award. The factors governing measurement of a punitive award
' The Horton Court distinguished the instructions given in an intentional tort case
and a gross negligence case. See id. at 389.
The instructions in an intentional tort case define [outrageous conducti
... as . . . "willful, malicious, and without justification," with the un-
derstanding that "[m]alice may be implied so long as the conduct is
sufficient to evidence conscious wrongdoing." [citing Fowler]. The instruc-
tions in a gross negligence case properly define [outrageous conduct] ...
as ... misconduct of a character evidencing "a wanton or reckless disre-
gard for ... other persons." [quoting the trial court].
Id.
'508 S.W.2d 759, 761 (Ky. 1974).
See 683 S.W.2d at 252.
See 508 S.W.2d at 762.
See 690 S.W.2d at 384.
' See note 75 supra.
See text accompanying notes 38-49, 66 supra.
See text accompanying notes 3-4 supra.
" See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 79, at 280 (1935).
"Since these damages are assessed for punishment ... a positive element of conscious
wrongdoing is always required." See generally D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
REMEDIES § 3.9, at 205-06 (1973).
1985-86]
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comprised the central issue in Fowler v. Mantooth.4 Fowler
involved an assault and battery 5 upon a health club employee
by a customer. Both parties were ex-football players "of excep-
tional size and strength. 3 86 At trial, the plaintiff, who had been
knocked unconscious by a single, unprovoked punch, 7 recovered
compensatory damages of $2,210 and punitive damages of
$20,000. The defendant appealed both awards as excessive 5 The
court of appeals, in an unpublished opinion, 89 acknowledged the
defendant's culpable mental state but reversed the punitive award
on the theory that "[a] single blow with practically no injury
... however wrong the blow" could not sustain a $20,000
awardP9 Prior Kentucky case law had established that in assess-
ing punitive damages, relevant considerations included both the
seriousness of the injury and the extent of the defendant's cul-
pability.9'
- 683 S.W.2d 250 (Ky. 1984). Factors employed by the Kentucky courts track the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1977), including "the character of the
defendant's act" and the seriousness of the plaintiff's injury. See 683 S.W.2d at 253;
Hensley v. Paul Miller Ford, 508 S.W.2d 759, 763 (Ky. 1974). The third factor expressed
in the Restatement is the defendant's wealth. "Kentucky does not subscribe to the
Restatement's third prong." 683 S.W.2d at 253 n.l. Texas and Alabama are the only
other jurisdictions that bar such proof. See I J. GmALRDi & J. KIRCHER, supra note 2,
at § 5.36. The vast majority of jurisdictions considers evidence of the defendant's wealth
relevant in assessing punitive damages so that the jury "may determine the sum of
damages which will be adequate enought to punish the defendant.. .." Id. See also
Comment, supra note 4, at 909-13, for a critical discussion of Kentucky's position; the
author advocates that evidence of the defendant's wealth be included in the assessment
criteria to better effectuate the punishment/deterrence goals of punitive damages. See
id. at 912. Additionally, the author proposes a bifurcated trial procedure that protects
the defendant from the undue influence a jury may give such evidence. See id. at 913-
15.
' Although the Court identified the cause of action as an assault, it is clear that
there was an assault and battery committed. A battery is defined as "any unlawful
touching of the person .. " Sigler v. Ralph, 417 S.W.2d 239, 241 (Ky. 1967) (citing I
CALDWELL'S KENTUCKY JUDICIAL DICTIONARY 262 (1916)).
683 S.W.2d at 251.
87 See id.
" See id. at 252.
Mantooth v. Fowler, No. 82-CA-2527-MR (Ky. Ct. App. July 29, 1983).
Id. slip op. at 4.
9, See 508 S.W.2d at 763 ("[Ihe seriousness of the injury and the culpability of
the one causing the injuries" are the relevant considerations in assessing an award.)
[Vol. 74
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2. Character of the Act
The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the intermediate court
and upheld both awards in Fowler.92 Although the high Court
disagreed with the court of appeals' conclusion that there was
no significant harm,93 the Court found "the character of the act
... of equal or greater importance" than the seriousness of the
injury in assessing punitive damages in this case.
94
Citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the Court listed
factors bearing on the character of the act: the degree of out-
rageousness, the extent of culpability, the motives of the wrong-
doer, the relationship between the parties, and the existence or
absence of provocation. 95 "To relate excessiveness of the award
only in terms of its reasonable relation to the injury sustained,
is to tell only half the story." 96 In fairness to the court of
appeals, it must be mentioned that the court did consider both
factors and not merely the seriousness of the injury. 97 In its
view, the combination of the injury and the act did not warrant
the substantial award. 9
8
3. Relationship to Compensatory Damages
The Supreme Court, in Fowler, also reiterated the principle
that when actual injury is proved, even nominal damages will
support a punitive damage award. 99 In contrast to some juris-
dictions, Kentucky does not require that a punitive award bear
" See 683 S.W.2d at 254.
" The court of appeals opinion states that there was "practically no injury." The
Supreme Court found this conclusion inconsistent with the compensatory award of
S2,210, but did not find this issue determinative. See id. at 253. At trial, plaintiff offered
proof that he was unconscious for over an hour, incurred medical expenses, lost time
from work, incurred physical pain and suffering, and was humiliated. See id. at 252.
Id. at 253.
Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 comment e (1977).
683 S.W.2d at 253.
See No. 82-CA-2527-MR, slip op. at 4.
See id. "There is simply not a sufficient relationship between the punitive
damage award, the' injuries sustained, and the acts causing them."
" See 683 S.W.2d at 252.
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any relation to the amount of compensatory damages awarded. °0
Since the goals of punishment and deterrence are served through
imposition of punitive damages, whereas compensatory damages
serve to indemnify the plaintiff for actual losses, there is no
logical reason why the size of the awards should correlate.
The Court also rejected the defendant's assertion that the
plaintiff's humiliation resulting from the incident could not
properly be considered by the jury in assessing the punitive
award. The argument itself is baffling because the jury instruc-
tion authorizing punitive damages made no reference to humil-
iation.'01 Possibly, the defendant's position was that punitive
damages are not warranted in a case where the only significant in-
jury is humiliation.102 Regardless of what was meant, the Court's
response was equally baffling.
The Court agreed that if the purpose of punitive damages
was compensatory in nature, humiliation might not properly be
considered since "compensatory damages ... arguably, do not
include humiliation per se."'' 3 This observation is totally incom-
,00 Compare Alamo Nat. Bank v. Kraus, 616 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. 1981) and Leach
v. Biscayne Oil & Gas Co. Inc., 289 S.E.2d 197 (W. Va. 1982) (Punitive damages must
be reasonably proportioned to compensatory damages.) with 508 S.W.2d at 763 (Punitive
damages need not bear a proportional relationship.) In Kentucky, however, punitive
damages must bear a relationship to "the injury and its cause complained of." Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Smith, 136 S.W.2d 759, 768 (Ky. 1940). See also 683
S.W.2d at 254. It is interesting that, in an early Kentucky case, an award of punitive
damages was upheld although no compensatory damages were awarded. See Louisville
& N.R.R. v. Ritchel, 147 S.W. 411 (Ky. 1912). In Ritchel, the plaintiff had "suffered
an injury for which compensatory damages might be awarded." Id. at 414. Since the
Fowler Court emphasized that the relative weight to be given the assessment criteria is
governed by the facts of each case, Ritchel may still be viable in a case where the
character of the defendant's act is particularly egregious but the actual damages are de
minimis. It is suggested, however, that where actual injury is proved, which it must be
to sustain a punitive award, a jury will be authorized to award nominal damages as
recognition that the plaintiff's rights have been violated. See 683 S.W.2d at 252.
lo, See No. 81-CA-2862 (Fayette Cir. Ct. May 24, 1982) Trial, Jury and Judgment.
The jury instruction authorizing the punitive award provided: "If you believe from the
evidence that the assault was willful, malicious, and without justification, you may, in
your discretion, award the Plaintiff punitive damages, not exceeding, however, the sum
of $50,000.00, the amount claimed in the Complaint." See also Comment, supra note
4, at 907 n.62.
,o1 While there were obviously other injuries, see note 93 supra, both the court of
appeals' and Supreme Court's opinions speak of significant humiliation in this case due
to plaintiff's employment circumstances. See 683 S.W.2d at 252; No. 82-CA-2527-MR,
slip op. at 3.
I'll See 683 S.W.2d at 253.
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patible with prior Kentucky case law expressly recognizing hu-
miliation and embarrassment as elements of compensatory
damages.1 4 At one time, the aim of punitive damages was to
compensate a plaintiff for such intangible injuries. 05 Increas-
ingly, these and other intangible harms have become elements
of recovery for compensatory damages.
0 6
Even more inexplicable is the Court's subsequent statement
that "in an act of this character the jury was authorized to
compensate ... for such humiliation ... ,,"o7Presumably, the
Court was referring to compensation in the form of punitive
damages, a contradiction in terms. In support, the Court cited
Mann v. Watson,1 1 an early Kentucky case. The Mann Court,
however, held that the plaintiff could properly recover for hu-
miliation as an element of compensatory damages.'09 There is
no mention of punitive damages in Mann. In sum, the Court
seemingly rejected and accepted a compensatory purpose for
punitive damages. The only logical interpretation of the Court's
statements is that the humiliation inflicted was relevant to the
jury's consideration of the character of the act. In particular,
an act designed to humiliate may bear upon the wrongdoer's
motives or the outrageousness of the act. This interpretation is con-
sistent with the function punitive damages are designed to serve.
II. VicARIous LIABILITY FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. The Broad Rule
From the previous discussion, one may properly conclude
that ordinarily the threshold for a punitive damage award is the
-4 See Kiser v. Neumann Co. Contractors, 426 S.W.2d 935, 938 (Ky. 1967) (com-
pensatory damages awarded in assault case included recovery for "embarrassment,
humiliation, shame and dishonor") (dictum).
,, See 147 S.W. at 414 (Punitive damages may compensate the plaintiff for hu-
miliation.)
1 See, e.g., Davis v. Graviss, 672 S.W.2d 928, 931 (Ky. 1984) (fear of future
medical complications resulting from injury is compensable); Craft v. Rice, 671 S.W.2d
247, 250 (Ky. 1984) (recognizing cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress); Wilson v. Redken Laboratories, Inc., 562 S.W.2d 633, 637 (Ky. 1978) (humil-
iation and distress are compensable).
10 683 S.W.2d at 253 (emphasis added).
283 S.W. 1052 (Ky. 1926).
See id. at 1055. Mann was similarly an assault and battery case in which the
plaintiff recovered compensatory damages for mental and physical pain and suffering,
humiliation, and medical expenses.
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existence of some aggravated wrong. At odds with the asserted
dual rationale for punitive damages-punishment and deter-
rence-is the rule followed in Kentucky and the substantial
minority"0 of other jurisdictions that exposes an innocent em-
ployer to punitive damage liability for the act of an employee.'
In Yellow Cab Co. of Louisville, Inc. v. Talley," 2 the court
of appeals upheld a punitive damage award against a non-
negligent taxi-cab company for "the gross negligence of its non-
managerial, subordinate agent.""' ' 3 The court, in a split 2-1 de-
cision," 4 held that "vicarious liability may ... be the sole basis
of a punitive damage award." 5 In so holding, the court re-
affirmed what it characterized as Kentucky's "longstanding"
adherence to the so-called "broad rule," which makes a punitive
damage award proper under the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior."6 The "broad rule" imposes employer liability for punitive
damages for an employee's act in the same manner as an em-
ployer may be liable for compensatory damages. No finding of
employer fault is required. Specifically, the court cited"7 Hawk-
ins & Co. v. Riley," 8 a mid-nineteenth century case that did not
follow the "broad rule." In Hawkins, another "taxi" (stage-
coach) case, the employer's liability for an employee's act was
couched in terms of the employer's own negligence in hiring
incompetent drivers.'' 9 Thus, Hawkins is not supportive since
,,o See 1 J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 2, at § 5.06 (1985 Supp.).
See Kiser v. Neumann Co. Contractors, 426 S.W.2d 935, 938 (Ky. 1967) ("doc-
trine of respondeat superior makes the master liable to the same extent as the servant");
Smith's Adm'x v. Middleton, 66 S.W. 388, 389 (Ky. 1902).
"2 No. 84-CA-1180-MR (Ky. Ct. App.), 32 Ky. L. SUMM. 1, at 9 (Ky. Ct. App.
Jan. 18, 1985) [hereinafter cited as KLS].
M, Id. slip op. at 1.
1"4 Justice Cooper dissented with no opinion.
M No. 84-CA-1180-MR, slip op. at 1.
116 Id. slip op. at 4. The "broad rule" is apparently no longer the majority view
although the court of appeals characterized it as such. See I J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER,
supra note 2, at § 5.06 (1985 Supp.). In contrast, the "complicity rule" limits an
employer's liability for punitive damages to instances where fault is established. See No.
84-CA-II80-MR, slip op. at 2.
,,7 No. 84-CA-1180-MR, slip op. at 3.
"1 56 Ky. (17 B. Mon.) 101 (Ky. 1856).
19 See id. at 110.
It is the duty of the proprietors of stage coaches ... to procure and
employ prudent and skillful drivers; and if neglectful of their duty, they
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liability was not considered strictly on a vicarious basis. The
court also relied heavily on Smith's Adm'x v. Middleton,120 a
1902 case which, although it makes no mention of a "broad
rule," does provide support for the rule espoused in Talley. In
Middleton, an employer was held liable for punitive damages
for his employee's gross negligence, even though the employer
was innocent of wrongdoing and had exercised due care in hiring
his employee.' 2' Middleton's precedential authority is question-
able, however, because the Middleton Court relied on Hawk-
ins,'22 which was distinguishable. Lastly, the Talley court cited
Continental Insurance Co's. v. Hancock, 23 a 1974 case, which
relied on Middleton. 24 However, whether punitive damages are
appropriately imposed on an employer solely on a vicarious basis
was not directly at issue in Hancock.
25
B. The Complicity Rule
As conceded in Talley, 26 the broad rule conflicts with the
view espoused in both the Restatement (Second) of Torts 27 and
intrust their vehicles to men unskillful and imprudent, who recklessly,
wantonly, or by gross negligence whilst in their employment ... injure
persons or property . . . the employers, as well as the drivers, should be
held amenable ... for the actual injury [and] for such exemplary damages
as a jury ... should deem proper to award.
Id.
66 S.W. 388 (Ky. 1902).
See id. at 389.
See id.
'., 507 S.W.2d 146 (Ky. 1974).
See id. at 151.
2" Id. Hancock involved, inter alia, the issue of whether an insurer was obligated
to pay a punitive damage award assessed against its insured. The insurer had argued
that it was against public policy to insure against liability for punitive damages. The
public policy implicated is that punitives should only fall upon a wrongdoer and that a
wrongdoer should not be able to escape sanctions for misconduct. See generally I J.
GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 2, at § 7.13. See also Zuger, Insurance Coverage of
Punitive Damages, 53 N.D.L. REv. 239 (1976-77). The Hancock Court held that public
policy is not violated when an insurer is held liable for punitive damages resulting from
its insured's gross negligence, as compared with an intentional wrongful act. In reaching
its decision, the Court relied on Middleton, which had also permitted liability for punitive
damages to fall on an innocent party-the employer. 507 S.W.2d at 151-52.
1-' See No. 84-CA-1180-MR, slip op. at 2.
1-" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (1977).
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the Restatement (Second) of Agency 28 that it is "improper ...
to award [punitive] damages against one who himself is person-
ally innocent."' 29 Indeed, the justification for awarding punitive
damages is greatly diminished where liability is imposed vicari-
ously.130 The innocent employer has not engaged in conduct that
merits punishment and deterrence. Moreover, even where the
employer is entitled to indemnity, the culpable employee may
not be able to partially or totally satisfy the judgment.' 3' Ad-
mittedly, this inequity also exists when an employer is held
vicariously liable for compensatory damages. In those circum-
stances, however, there is a competing public policy that places
the burden on the employer, rather than the injured party, to
bear the expense for any losses. 3 2 This policy consideration is
not applicable to damage assessments designed to punish and
deter a wrongdoer.
Consequently, the slight majority of jurisdictions3 3 concurs
with the Restatements and applies the "complicity rule" which
limits an employer's liability for punitive damages to instances
in which the employer has engaged in conduct that justifies the
award.' 34 Thus, an employer may be liable when (1) the employer
has authorized the employee's act,' 35 (2) the employer was reck-
less in hiring the employee, l3 6 (3) the employer has ratified the
employee's act,' 37 or, (4) the employee holds a managerial posi-
tion and is acting within the scope of his or her duties. 3 s
'1 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217 C (1958).
329 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 comment b (1977).
'10 When punitive damages are imposed on a nonculpable employer, the wrongdoer
"is insulated by the simple fact of life that the harmed plaintiff will usually seek the
deepest pocket from which to collect his damages." 1 J. GHLA.Di & J. KIRCHER, supra
note 2, at § 5.06. But see Morris, Punitive Damages in Personal Injury Cases, 21 OIo
ST. L.J. 216, 219-20 (1960) (Imposing institutional liability may deter employee miscon-
duct.).
"' See 1 J. GHLAIUi & J. KIRCHER, supra note 2, at § 5.06.
1 See R. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2 (5th ed. 1934).
" See 1 J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 2, at § 5.07 (1985 Supp.).
" Dobbs attributes the origin of the term, "complicity rule," to Professor Clarence
Morris. See D. DOBBS, supra note 83, at 214. See generally Morris, supra note 130, at
221.
" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909(a) (1977).
336 See id. at § 909(b).
" See id. at § 909(d).
"1 See id. at § 909(c). While it might be argued that imposing liability in this
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C. Future Vitality of the Broad Rule in Kentucky
Under Talley, an employer may be held liable for punitive
damages absent any of the above factors. 139 Although Talley has
seemingly clarified Kentucky's current position (on the basis of
questionable precedent), a recent Kentucky Supreme Court de-
cision appears less enthusiastic about the future vitality of the
"broad rule."' 4
In Horton v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 41 discussed
earlier, one of the arguments advanced by the defendant gas
company in its appeal of a punitive damage award was that "the
punitive damages concept is abused when a corporation as prin-
cipal is punished for the acts of its employees.'1 4 2 In response,
the high Court acknowledged that "historically" Kentucky has
applied the doctrine of respondeat superior to impose liability
for punitive damages against an employer in the same manner
liability for compensatory damages is imposed. 43 Indeed the
Court could have disposed of the defendant's argument on the
basis of Kentucky's "historical" position. Nevertheless, it neither
rejected the merits of the argument nor reaffirmed this tradi-
tional stance. '1 Ultimately it skirted the issue based on evidence
that the gas company itself was culpable and that punitive dam-
ages were not being assessed solely on a vicarious basis. 45 The
opinion suggests, however speculatively, 1" 6 that the Court has
instance does not further the purposes of punitive damages, comment "b" to this section
justifies the rule as providing a "deterrent to the employment of unfit persons for
important positions." There is no explanation as to why § 909(b) would not accom-
modate this situation.
No. 84-CA-1180-MR, slip op. at 4.
' Horton v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 690 S.W.2d 382 (Ky. 1985).
'" 690 S.W.2d 382 (Ky. 1985). See notes 14-66 supra and accompanying text.
See 690 S.W.2d at 390.
See id. Although this portion of the opinion cites no authority, the Court earlier
referred to decisions that upheld a punitive damage award vicariously imposed on an
employer. See id. at 388. Specifically, the Court cited Louisville & N.R.R. v. Kelly's
Adm'x, 38 S.W. 852 (Ky. 1897) and Maysville & Lexington R.R. v. Herrick, 76 Ky. (13
Bush) 122 (1877). It is interesting that in both of these cases, punitive damages were
assessed on a gross negligence standard characterized as the failure to use slight care.
" See 690 S.W.2d at 390.
" See id.
" The Court merely notes that the facts of Horton provide an inappropriate case
to begin reconsideration of the rule.
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not closed the door to a re-evaluation and potential limitation
of the "broad rule" should an appropriate opportunity arise.
Consequently, a nonculpable employer, who has been rendered
liable for punitive damages due to the act of a nonmanagerial
employee, can perhaps successfully argue this issue in a future
case.
III. PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN FIRST PARTY BAD FAITH ACTIONS
First party bad faith actions' 47 against insurance companies
have been a much-debated 48 and often-litigated topic149 in recent
years. These suits are brought by an insured against its insurer,
alleging bad faith refusal to pay a valid claim or bad faith delay
in processing a claim. 150 The cause of action has been only
recently recognized in Kentucky.'' Consequently, it is the subject
of only a handful of decisions.
Feathers v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.1 2 was the first
Kentucky decision to recognize the tort of first party bad faith.
Under this cause of action, a prevailing plaintiff-insured is en-
titled to damages over and above policy limits, including, poten-
tially, punitive damages.' Feathers constituted a dramatic
departure from Kentucky's traditional stance, which limited re-
covery by insured parties to only those amounts due under the
insurance policy contract. 14 The sparsity of Kentucky case law
141 1 J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 2, at § 8.08, explains: "The claim of
the plaintiff in a first party excess action is premised upon the assertion that the insurer
either failed to perform its obligation to pay money when the same was due or that the
insurer improperly delayed the processing and payment of a valid claim." First party
bad faith imposes tort liability upon an insurer, exposing it to damages beyond those
that could be recovered in an action on the contract alone. See id. at § 8.11.
"I See, e.g., Harvey & Wiseman, First Party Bad Faith: Common Law Remedies
and a Proposed Legislative Solution, 72 Ky. L.J. 141 (1983-84); Harman, An Insurer's
Liability for the Tort of Bad Faith, 42 MONT. L. REv. 67 (1981); Kircher, Insurer's
Mistaken Judgment-A New Tort?, 59 MARQ. L. REv. 775 (1976).
"' See generally 1 J. GHLARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 2, at § 8.11, and cases
cited therein.
., See note 147 supra.
"' See Feathers v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 667 S.W.2d 693 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1983).
.52 667 S.W.2d 693 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983). See Knapp, Survey-Insurance, 74 Ky.
L.J. 427, 432 (1985-86).
"I See id. at 697.
1" See Deaton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 548 S.W.2d 162, 164 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
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and the courts' inconsistent language in those few decided cases'5 s
create some confusion as to (1) the elements that establish the
tort, and (2) once the tort is established, the additional facts, if
any, required to authorize a punitive damage award.
In Feathers, the defendant-insurer refused to pay fire loss
damages under a homeowner's policy, asserting a reasonable
belief that its insureds had deliberately set fire to their home.
56
Almost a year after the fire, the plaintiffs-insureds sued the
insurer to recover their losses. Their complaint alleged, in part,
that the insurer breached a duty to act in good faith and re-
quested consequential and punitive damages. 5 7 The trial court
dismissed that portion of the complaint. 5 8 On appeal as to the
validity of the tort claim, the court of appeals held that the
plaintiffs had pled a good cause of action if the plaintiffs had
substantially complied 59 with the terms of the policy and if there
was no "substantial or credible"' 6 evidence that the plaintiffs
had intentionally set fire to their home. Upon this proof, the
court reasoned that the insurer "becomes akin to a fiduciary as
to sums that may be owed under the policy.' ' 6' "[B]ad manners
or mere breakdowns in communications' 6 2 were explicitly re-
jected as conduct that would give rise to the tort. In reaching
its decision, the Feathers court placed some emphasis on the
unique nature of a homeowner's fire insurance policy. "The
purchaser of a fire insurance policy ... is usually economically
devastated after a fire and may have no source of money...
other than the proceeds of the insurance policy ... relied
upon."' 61 Under these circumstances, the court continued, an
"unjustified" refusal to pay constituted tortious conduct and
exposed the insurer to liability for consequential and punitive
damages. 64
" See note 152 supra; notes 166, 185 infra and accompanying text.
See 667 S.W.2d at 694.
See id.
See id. at 695.
, See id. at 697. "Substantial compliance" is not defined.
" Id. "Substantial or credible" evidence is not defined.
Id.
"- Id.
I Id.
',. See id.
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While this language may indicate that punitive damages are
only potentially recoverable in a tort action for first party bad
faith, it may also be read as authorizing punitive damages every
time the tort itself has been sufficiently established.
The Feathers court, however, never was required to decide
the merits of the case. 65 Its ruling was confined only to the
validity of the tort claim. Consequently, the issue of when pu-
nitive damages are recoverable was not decided.
The next case to reach the appellate court involving a first
party bad faith claim was Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Ken-
tucky v. Whitaker.1 66 In Whitaker, the plaintiff-insured sued its
insurer on a claim under a health insurance policy. The defend-
ant had denied the claim based upon a physician's report that
erroneously indicated that the health problem had existed prior
to the advent of the insured's coverage. 67 The existence of a
pre-existing condition precluded recovery under the terms of the
policy. It was not until the day before trial that the insurer spoke
directly with the physician and discovered the error. 6 At trial,
the jury found the insurer liable for bad faith and awarded the
amount due under the contract as well as consequential damages
for the attorneys fees incurred.
69
161 The trial court had granted the insurer a summary judgment on the tort claim.
The court of appeals' decision in Feathers was rendered after the parties settled the case
and a full week after the court received notice of the settlement. For a discussion of the
unique procedural posture of Feathers, see Harvey & Wiseman, supra note 148, at 169
n.162.
-' 687 S.W.2d 557 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985). See Knapp, Survey-Insurance, 74 Ky.
L.J. 427, 431 (1985-86).
,17 See id. at 558.
I" See id.
.69 See id. The court of appeals reversed the consequential damages award, citing
their previous decision holding that attorney fees are not recoverable in Kentucky absent
a statute or contract that expressly provides for recovery of such costs. See id. (citing
White v. Sullivan, 667 S.W.2d 385, 389 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983)). In an opinion rendered
subsequent to Whitaker, the court of appeals granted approval, at least implicitly, to an
award of attorney fees in the form of punitive damages. In Chernick v. Fasig-Tipton,
Kentucky, Inc., No. 84-CA-1507-MR (Ky. Ct. App.), 33 KLS 2, at 5 (Ky. Ct. App.
Jan. 31, 1986), the court upheld a punitive damage award assessed against the seller of
a thoroughbred broodmare. The seller was found liable for fraud and misrepresentation.
The court did not elaborate on how the award was assessed, stating only that "this
court is in complete agreement with the Fayette Circuit Court's findings and conclusions
and will not disturb the award of punitive damages." Id. slip op. at 6. The trial court,
sitting without a jury, had assessed a $40,000 punitive award, based in part upon "the
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On the insurer's appeal, the court of appeals reversed the
trial court on the issue of bad faith. 70 The appellate court
believed that the facts presented in Whitaker reflected a mere
"breakdown in communications' 7 7J rather than a bad faith re-
fusal to pay a claim. To clarify its previous decision, the court
stated that Feathers should not be interpreted "as creating a
type of strict liability"1 72 every time an insurer incorrectly denies
a claim. The court found that the one-day delay in paying the
claim, once the insurer was apprised of the error, did not amount
to bad faith. 73 Moreover, the court found that the insurer's
investigation of the claim was nothing "more than negligent, if
that.' 74 Negligence alone, it held, would not provide a sufficient
basis to support a claim of first party bad faith.'7 "The term
itself implies some intentional wrongful conduct.' ' 76 Neverthe-
less, the court made a further observation: "Where . .. a rea-
sonable basis existed for denying the claim..., though ultimately
found incorrect, [the insurer] cannot be charged with bad
faith.' '1 77 The negative implication, then, is that the lack of a
reasonable basis is sufficient to support a claim of bad faith.
The "reasonableness" standard indicates that a negligence
standard' 7 is being applied despite prior language to the con-
expense of litigation and the attorneys fees incurred by reason thereof." No. 83-Cl-
1365, slip op. at 20 (Fayette Cir. Ct. Apr. 5, 1984). The court of appeals' agreement
with the trial court's assessment criteria not only conflicts with their prior position in
disallowing attorney fees, but also is a marked departure from Kentucky's treatment of
punitive damages as fulfilling punishment/deterrence goals and not compensatory ends.
See 687 S.W.2d at 560.
" Id. at 559 (citing 667 S.W.2d at 696).
172 687 S.W.2d at 559 (citing Harvey & Wiseman, supra note 148, at 174).
VI See 687 S.W.2d at 559 ("delay of one day, upon learning the true facts, [not]
so dilatory as to constitute bad faith").
"1, Id. The claim was reviewed by Blue Cross, a medical consultant, and an
independent Kentucky Medical Association Peer Review Committee. Each denied the
claim after a review of all records. "At no time during the investigation ... did it
become apparent that the history taken by [the physician] ... was a mistake." Id.
17 See id.
Id.
" Id. at 559-60. This statement does clarify some confusion that followed in the
wake of Feathers, i.e., whether an insurer's incorrect denial of payment, alone, would
always expose the insurer to liability for extra-contractual damages based on the tort of
first party bad faith. See Conner v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 600 F. Supp. 24, 27 (W.D.
Ky. 1984). See also Harvey & Wiseman, supra note 148, at 173-74.
0 See 1 J. GHIARDI & J. KiRcHER, supra note 2, at § 8. 11.
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trary.' 79 The distinction is critical. There is substantially more
than a fine line between "intentional wrongful conduct" and an
unreasonable belief. Perhaps the court sought to equate "unrea-
sonableness" with recklessness or gross negligence. In any event,
insurers are entitled to know the basis for their potential liability.
This lack of clarity poses a further problem concerning pu-
nitive damages. It is not discernible from the opinion what
difference, if any, exists in the level of culpability required to
sustain the underlying tort action and the culpability needed to
warrant imposition of punitive damages. The court stated that
"we cannot uphold a verdict allowing consequential or punitive
damages"'1s0 absent willful, intentional or reckless conduct.
Nevertheless, the court did not distinguish between this level of
misconduct and that giving rise to the tort. If liability for the
tort may be imposed upon an insurer who acts without a rea-
sonable belief, though innocently, punitive damages are not jus-
tified. As discussed earlier in this Survey, it is the defendant's
mental state that exposes him to punitive damage liability.' s '
Most jurisdictions8 2 concur that proof of the tort itself does
not automatically entitle the insured to punitive damages. To
warrant punitive damages, the insurer's breach of his duty to
act in good faith must be accompanied by the aggravating cir-
cumstances that normally justify punitives, such as fraud or
malice.' 83 Kentucky courts have repeatedly maintained that mis-
conduct, even an intentional wrong, does not necessarily warrant
punitive damages.1 4 If the Whitaker court departed from this
position regarding first party bad faith actions, it articulated no
reason why insurers should be exposed to liability for punitive
damages on a different basis than other defendants.
" See notes 9-13 supra and accompanying text.
687 S.W.2d at 559.
"' See notes 5-7 supra and accompanying text.
See 1 J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 2, at § 8.14.
,' See, e.g., Gulf Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 405 So. 2d 916, 925 (Ala. 1981)
(allowing recovery of punitive damages only if plaintiff proves "malice, willfulness, or
wanton and reckless disregard of the rights of others"); Anderson v. Continental Ins.
Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 379 (Wis. 1978) ("must be a showing of an evil intent deserving
of punishment or of something in the nature of special ill-will or wanton disregard of
duty or gross or outrageous conduct").
"' See notes 60-61, 70-72 supra and accompanying text.
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The most recent Kentucky decision on first party bad faith
is Federal Kemper Ins. Co. v. Hornback.85 Hornback, like
Feathers, involved a fire loss claim that the insurer refused to
pay. Unlike Feathers,8 6 the bad faith issue in Hornback ulti-
mately was litigated and subsequently appealed to the court of
appeals. That the case was tried is important because an aware-
ness of the facts, the resolution of the factual disputes, and the
ultimate outcome on appeal should assist the bar in coming to
grips with how the Kentucky courts are dealing with first party
bad faith issues. Unfortunately, the opinion omitted several in-
structive facts.'
87
In Hornback, the plaintiffs purchased a fire insurance policy
for their home from the defendant in December, 1983. In Jan-
uary, 1984, the home was destroyed in an intentionally set fire.',8
The plaintiffs filed a timely proof of loss statement, made their
bank account records available to one of the defendant's adjus-
ters, and also submitted a sworn statement of loss to the defend-
ant's counsel.'t 9 The insurer refused to pay the claim, however,
on the basis that "the evidence of arson relieved it of its con-
tractual obligations under the policy."'' 9 The plaintiffs sued and
recovered $50,000 for the loss and $4,000 in punitive damages. 9'
The insurer appealed the punitive damage award on two
grounds. First, it asserted that the evidence of arson and mis-
representations in the proof of loss form justified its denying
the claim. 192 The court disagreed, finding that the plaintiffs'
timely claim satisfied the terms and conditions of the policy.
93
The opinion does not enumerate the misrepresentations that were
allegedly made by the plaintiff. Moreover, the court held that
although the evidence that the plaintiffs intentionally set the fire
" No. 84-CA-2215-MR (Ky. Ct. App.), 32 KLS 9, at 7 (Ky. Ct. App. July 5,
1985), motion for discretionary rev. filed 32 KLS 10, at 8 (July 19, 1985).
See note 165 supra and accompanying text.
, See notes 192-196 infra and accompanying text.
See No. 84-CA-2215-MR, slip op. at 2.
See id.
"' Id.
'M Id.
See id.
See id. slip op. at 3.
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was sufficient to submit this issue to the jury, 94 such proof
"does not constitute substantial or credible evidence,"' 95 as con-
templated in Feathers, that would excuse the insurer's withhold-
ing the proceeds. "Substantial or credible evidence" is otherwise
left undefined. Unfortunately, the opinion fails to explain spe-
cifically what evidence was introduced at trial concerning the
insureds' alleged complicity. It is particularly unfortunate for
insurers who are currently exposed to potential liability for sub-
stantial damages. Since the outcome of these cases is peculiarly
fact-determinative, the court should have taken pains to enu-
merate those facts that established bad faith. Otherwise, it is
conceivable that insurers will suffer a disincentive to delay pay-
ment of a claim, even where a meritorious defense to the claim
exists. 196 While the facts in Hornback may have amply supported
the outcome, a failure to explain those facts acts as a disservice
to those relying on the court for guidance. The lack of Kentucky
case law on this cause of action emphasizes this need.
The insurer's second challenge to the award argued that "bad
faith alone will not support punitive damages absent a showing
of malice or fraud."1 97 The court could have promptly dismissed
this contention by merely pointing to the jury's express finding
that the insurer did act with malice in its refusal to pay the
claim. 19 Instead, the court held that bad faith alone normally
does support an award of punitive damages. 99 In so holding,
the court, as it did in Feathers, emphasized the "sensitive"
nature of an insurance contract and the vulnerability of the
insured party when disaster strikes. 200
[A]n insurance policy is a uniquely sensitive contract to provide
security and relief in the face of a future disaster. Under these
, See id. "The evidence presented at trial clearly shows that [plaintiffs'] residence
was destroyed in a set fire, but there was little or no evidence linking either of them to
the crime." Id.
See 667 S.W.2d at 696.
' "The spectre of seven figure punitive damage awards will no doubt lead insur-
ance carriers to avoid the risk of an adverse verdict, and to forego defense of at least
some meritorious claims." Harvey & Wiseman, supra note 148, at 175.
117 No. 84-CA-2215-MR, slip op. at 1.
" See id. slip op. at 3. In fact, the court subsequently noted the jury's finding but
did not decide the issue on this ground. See id. slip op. at 3-4.
See id. slip op. at 3.
i,' See id.; 667 S.W.2d at 696.
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circumstances, the insurer incurs a duty to act in good faith
toward its policy holders and the insured may recover for a
simple breach of that duty. [Citation omitted]. 201
Thus, "[i]f the insurer makes no serious attempt to settle a
valid pending claim until forced into litigation, . . . a jury may
find bad faith and may award punitive damages.
' 20 2
Presumably, then, proof of the underlying cause of action,
redefined in Hornback as a failure to make a "serious attempt"
to settle a valid claim, entitles every plaintiff to a concurrent
instruction on punitive damages. This places the tort of bad
faith in a position inconsistent with other torts in Kentucky.2 0 3
If "bad faith" necessarily included the aggravated circumstances
that ordinarily justify punitive damages, assessment would be
proper. Conversely, if "bad faith" may be found when there is
a failure to act reasonably, and a negligence standard is applied,
permitting a punitive award is totally inconsistent with the avowed
purposes of imposing punitive damages.
No. 84-CA-2215-MR, slip op. at 3.
Id. (emphasis added).
z' See notes 60-61, 70-72 supra and accompanying text.
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